Anne Conway 1631-79

Anne Conway, née Finch, was horn in 1631 and died in 1679. In i 65 I: she married the third Viscount Conway, and they lived at Ragley in Warwickshire. Her book The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosopby was probably written in 1670. It was written in English but later translated into Latin, in which language it was published in 1690. This Latin version was certainly read, and referred to, by Leibniz. In 1692 an English version of the Latin text was produced, without reference to the original English text, which may already have been lost. It is from this version that most of chapters 6 and 7 are reproduced below. Both Latin and subsequent English texts are in the British Library, hut I have used a publication of English and Latin texts together, edited by Peter Lopston and published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, in 1982.

In these chapters, which are central to the book, Anne Conway argues that there exist exactly three kinds of substance, which are essentially different one from another.

The first is that which is wholly immutable, i.e. God;

the second is that which in its essence is both mutable and immutable, i.e. the Logos or Christ;

the third is the mutable, i.e. everything else that exists.

Mutability entails motion, and motion is the origin of time, which is relative to motion and change. It is impossible for one of these kinds of substance to change into any other kind; but the third kind of substance, all creation, shares the same nature, and therefore it is theoretically possible for any one item of the created world to change into any other.

This theoretical possibility is distinct from the fact that in the world we inhabit, according to the laws we understand, a man will not change into another, still less into a horse. The impossibility of Peter's changing into Paul in the world we have is, however, different from the essential impossibility (impossibility de re) of a man or any other ereated thing changing into God. Things stand like this because of the goodness of God, who has chosen to make a perfectible universe. 

There are three systems to which Anne Conway's theories are opposed:

first, she is opposed to the materialism of Thomas Hobbes, who held matter or substance to be divided up only according to the arbitrary categories which language imposes on it;

secondly, she is opposed to the dualism of Descartes, who held that there were two, and only two kinds of substance - thinking substance, and material or extended substance - and that humans were essentially thinking beings;

thirdly, she is opposed to the theory of Spinoza, according to whom the whole of nature is identical with God but seen under a different aspect.

The obvious objection to Anne Conway's system is that in real life all created things do not appear to be of the same substance: the distinction, central to Descartes, between mind and matter seems too important to be simply overlooked.

Her response would be that everything thinks or reacts to other things, hut some things (especially humans) think more coherently and more clearly than others. The apparent differences between, for example, stones and men are real differences and can be confirmed by all kinds of observed regularities in the world, but they are not essential differences. Where Anne Conway posits 'thinking' as the characteristic of all created things, Leibniz was later to posit 'activity' as the characteristic of all monads. Things in the universe appear different from one another, and one can describe these differences systematically, to account for apparent motion and change in the world; but in essence, according to Leibniz, monads are distinguished from one another only by the degree of their activity. There is no doubt that there are striking similarities between Leibniz's monadology and Anne Conway's theory of substance. Indeed, it is easier to make sense of her somewhat bizarre-seeming theory by comparing it with that of Leibniz, who reached his position by logical as weil as metaphysical and theological arguments. I have therefore added some works by and about Leibniz in the reading-suggestions below.
Furtber Reading
Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philos. opby, ed. Peter Loptson, International Archives of the History of Idea! (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, i98z)
Leihniz, Monadology, 1714 (The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz, ed Parkinson)
The Goncise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosopbers, ed. j. 0. Urmson (London: Hutchinson, i96o), s.n. Leibniz.
William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Ciarendon Press, 19 62-), PP- 3 20-3 6-
From The Principies of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. Peter Loptson (The Hague:
Martinus Niihoff, rg 82-), chapters vi-vii
i. That all Creatures in their own Nature are changeable, the distinktion between God and Creatures, duly considered, evi- dently evinces, and the same is by daily experience confirmed. Now if any Creature be in its own Nature changeable, it hath this Mutability, as it is a Creature, and consequently all Creatures wiii have the same, according to that Rule- Whatsoever agrees to any thing as placed under this or that Species, agrees to all compre- hended under the same Species; hut Mutability agrees to a Creature (which is the most general name of that Species, under which all Creatures are comprehended,) and from thence it is manifest; for otherwise there would be no distinktion between God and Creatures: For if any Creature were of it self, and in its own Nature unchangeable, that Creature would be God, because Immutability is one of his incommunicable Attributes.
7.. Now let us consider how far this Mutability may reach, or be extended; and, First, whether one Individual can be changed into another of the same or a different Species. This, I say, is impossible; for then the very Essences of Things would be changed, which would make a great confusion, not only in the Creatures, hut in the Wisdom of God,, which made all Things: As for Exampie: If this Man could be changed into that, viz. Paul into judas, or judas into Paul, then he that sinned would not be punished for his sin, but another in his stead, who was both Vertuous and Innocent; so then a Good Man would not receive the reward of his Vertue, but a Vicious Man in his stead: But if we suppose one good Man to be changed into another, as Paul into Peter. and Peter into Paul, Paul would not receive his own proper

Reward, hut Peters nor Peter his, hut Paul's, which would be a confusion, and unhecoming the Wisdom of God. Moreover, if the very individual Essences of Things could be changed one into another, it would follow, Creatures were not true in themselves; and so we could not be assured, nor have any certain knowiedge of any thing; and then all the inbred Notions and Dictates of Truth, which Men generally find in themselves, would be false, and by consequence the Conclusions drawn from thence; for every true Science, or certainty of Knowiedge, depends upon the Truth of the Objects, which are commonly called Veritates Objectivae, or Objective Truths: If therefore these Objective Truths should be changed the one into the other, certainly the Truth of the Propositions depending thercon would be changed also; and so no Proposition could be unchangcably true, no not the most clear and ohvious as these are; the whole is greater than its part, and two halves make a whole.
3. The Second Thing to be considered is, Whether one Species of Things can be changed into another? Where wc must diligently observe after what manner the Species of Things are distinguished one from another; for there be many Species of Things, which are commonly so called, and yet in Substance of Essence differ not one from another, hut in certain Manners or Properties, and when those Modes or Properties are changed, that thing is said to have changed its Species: Now whetber or no this be not a certain manner of Existence, and not the Essence or Bein of the Thing it
self that is so changed? As when Water indeed is not changed, but remains the same, and coid coagulates it, which before was fluid: When Water is changed into a Stone, certainly there is no reason, why we should here suppose a greater change of its Substance, than in the former Example of Water turned into Ice. And again when a Stone is changed into soft and tender Earth, here is made no change of its Substance; and so in all other Mutations which we observe in Things, the Substance or Essence always remains the same, and there is only a change of Modus or Manner; so that when a Thing ceases to be after this manner, it then begins to be after another manner. And indeed the same Reasons do prove, that one Species essentially or substantially distinct from another, cannot be changed into another, even as one Individual cannot be changed into another: For the Species of Things are notning else hut lndividuals digested, or comprehended, under one general
Idea of the Mind, or Common Term of speaking: As a Man, inasmuch as be is a Species, comprehends under him all the Individuals of Men; and a Horse is a Species, comprehending every individual Horse. Now if one Man cannot be changed into another, much less can this Man be changed into another Individual of a differing Species. For Exampie: If Alexander cannot be changed into Darius, be cannot be changed into his own Horse Bucephalus.
4. In order to know how far the Mutations of Things can reach, wc must examine how many Species of Things there be, which as to Substance or Essence are distinct one from another; and if we diligently inquire thereinto, we shall find only Threc, as before was said, viz. God, Christ, and the Creatures, and that these Threc in respect of Essence, are really distinct one from another, is already proved; hut there can be no Reason alledged to prove, that there is any Fourth kind of Being distinct from the other Threc; yea, a Fourth kind of scems wholly superfluous: And because all the Phaenomena in the whole Universe may be sufficiently resolved into these Three before-mentioned, as into their proper and original Causes, there is no nccessity to acknowiedge any other, according to this Rule: (V@hich if rightly understood, it is most true and certain) Beings are not to be multiplied without necessity; for seeing the Three before-mentioned remove all the Specifical Differences in Substances, which possibly can be conceived in our Minds; and so by these alone is that vast and infinite possibility of Things filled up: How then can there be room or place found for a Fourthl Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Being? And that it is performed by these Threc is already before demonstrated; to wit, that whatsoever can be in any wise called a Being, the same is either wholly unchangeable, and such is God the Supreme Being, or is wholly changeable, viz. to good, or evil and such is the creature or lowest being, or that which is partly unchangcable, viz. in respect of Evil, or partly changeable, to wit, in respect of Good; by which is understood Christ, the Son of God; that Middie Being between God and the Creatures; into what Classis or Rank therefore shall we bring a certain Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Being, &c. which is neither wholly changeable, nor wholly unchangcable; nor partly changeable, nor partly unchangeable: Besides, he that supposeth a certain Fourth Being, essentially or 

substantially distinet from the three before-mentioned, over- throws that most excellent Order we find in the universality of Things, to wit, that there is not only one Medium between God and the Creatures, hut two, threc, four, five, six, or as many as can be supposed between first and latter. Moreover, it is very consentaneous to sound Reason. and so also to the Order of Things, that as God is hut One, ncither hath he two, three, or more distinet Substances in him; and Christ hut one Christ, neither hath in him more distinet Substances, inasmuch as he is the beavenly Man, and very First Adam; so likewise the Creature, or whole Creation, is but one only Substance or Essence in Specie, although it comprehends many Individuals placed in their subordinate Species, and indecd in Manner, hut not in Substance or Essence distinct one from another. And so that which Paul speaketh concerning Man, may in like manner be understood of all Creatures, (who in their Original State were a certain Species of Man so called for their Excellencies, as hereafter shall be shown;) to wit, that God made all Nations, or Armies of Creatures. out of one Blood: And certainly here the reason of hoth is the same; for as God made all Nations out of one Blood, to the end they might love cach other, and stand in a mutual Sympathy, and help cach other; so hath he implanted a certain Universal Sympathy and mutual Love in Creatures, as being all Members of one Body, and (as I may so say-) Brethren, having one common Father, to wit, God in Christ, or the Word made Flesh; and so also one Mother, viz. that Substance or Essence alone, out of which they proeceded, and whereof they are real Parts and Members; and albeit Sin hath in a wonderful Manner impaired this Love and Sympathy, yet it hath not destroyed it.
5. Those Threc distinct Beings, before-mentioned, being granted, and no more, which are wholly inconvertible the one into the other, we shall tread in a secure path, in the mid-way of Truth, leaving these grand Errors and Confusions about Entity, hoth on the Right Hand and the left: For, First, there are some, who teach, that there is hut one Being of all Things, whereof the Creatures are real and Proper Parts, and these confound God and the Creatures together, as though both were hut one single Essence; so that Sin and Devils would be nothing else hut Parts, or at least Modifica- tions of that Divine Being, from whence do arise very dangerous consequences. Although I would not have it misinterpreted to
those who are unwarily faln into this Opinion; yet I would warn the Reader, that he may the better consider whereunto such Principies tend, and avoid their absurdity. There are others again who allow only two Species of Things, viz. God the Supreme Being, wholly unchangcable; and the Creature the lowest Being, wholly changcable; hut these do not duly consider that excellent Order by us above described, which is apparent in all Things; because else peradventure they would have taken notice, that besides tbese Two Extreams,, there is a certain Medium, which is partaker of hoth, and this is Jesus that Christ, whom not only the wiser sort of the jews, but also some among the Gentiles so called, have acknowiedged, viz. maintaining that there is such a Medium, which they called by divers Names, as Logos, the Son of God, the First Begotten of God, Mind, Wisdom, heavenly Adam &c. So that some also do call him the Eternal Medium.- Which Things, if duly considered, may not a little conduce to the propagation and furtbering of the true Faith, and Christian Religion, among the jews, as weil as Turks, and other Infidel Nations; that is to say, if it appears wc are able to prove that there is a mediator between God and Man; yea, between God and all Creatures, by as solid Reasons as those are, which prove God to be a Creator: And so they that believe on that, may be said truly to believe on Christ Jesus, though they should not as yet have known, or been convicted, that he came in the Flesh- For if they yield to the former, they wiii undoubtedly be forced (if ingenious) whetber they wiii or no, to grant the latter. Others there are, who do as it were infinitely multiply the Specifical Beings of Things, in their distinet Essences and Essential Attributes; which wholly subverts that excellent Order of Things, and greatly obscures and darkens the Glory of the Divine Attributes, so that it cannot shine forth in its duc Spiendor and Brightness in the Creatures: For so every Creature is so exceeding straitly hounded, and strictiy inciuded and impris- oned within the narrow limits of its own Species, that the Mutability of Creatures is wholly taken away: Neither can any Creature variously exercise any greater participation of Divine Goodness, or be advanced or promoted to any farther perfection.
6. All which wc shall demonstrate by one or two Exampies: And First, let us take an Horse, which is a Creature indued with divers degrees of perfeetion by his Creator, as not only strength of Body, 

hut (as I may so say) a certain kind of knowiedge, how be ought to serve his Master, and moreover also Love,, Fear, Courage, Memory, and divers other Qualities which are in Man: which also wc may observe in a Dog, and many other Animals: Seeing therefore the Divine Power., Goodness, and Wisdom, hath ereated every Creature good; and indeed so, that it might by continual augmentations (in its Mutability) be advanced to a greater degree of Goodness, ad infinitum, whereby the Glory of those Attributes do more and more shine forth: And seeing such is the Nature of every Creature, that it is always in Motion or Operation, which doth most certainly tend unto an bigher degree of Goodness, as the Reward and Fruit of its Labour; uniess the Creatures hinder that good by a voluntary Transgression, and abuse of that indifferency of Will which God placed in them in their Creation. Now I demand, unto what higher perfection and degree of Goodness, the Being or Essence of an Horse doth or may attain after be bath done good service for his Master, and so performed his Du ', and what
is proper for such a Creature? Is a Horse then a mere Fabrick or dead Matter? or hath be a Spirit in him, having Knowiege, Sence, and Love, and divers other Faculties and Properties of a Spirit? if be hath, which cannot be denied, what becomes of this spirit when the Horse dies? if it be said it passeth into Life, and takes upon it another Body of an Horse, so that it becomes a Horse as before, which Horse may be stronger and fairer, and of a more excellent Spirit than before. Very weil! But if be shall die, two, three, or four times, &c. shall be always remain a Horse, though be be still better, and more excellent, by how much the oftner his Spirit revolves. Now I demand, whether the Spirit of an Horse hath in it such infinite perfection, that a Horse may always become better and better ad infinitum, and yet so as to remain a Horse? For as the common reccived Opinion is, this visible Earth shall not always remain in the same State, which may be confirmed by undeniable Reasons: Now it necessarily follows, that the continual Genera- tion of Animals in these gross Bodies shall cease also; for if the Earth shall take on it another Form, neither any longer bring forth Grass, Horses and other Animals shall cease to be such as they were before: And seeing they want their proper Aliment, they cannot remain in the same Species; yet nevertheless they are not annihilated, as may be easily conceived; for how can any thing be annihilated, seeing the Goodness of God towards his Creatures
always remains the same; and the conservation or continuation of Creatures is a continued Creation, as is generally granted, and already before demonstrated, that God is a perpetual Creator; and as he is the most frec, so also the most necessary Agent: But if it be denied, that the Earth is unchangcable, as before was said, then it will come to pass that Horses and other Animals, according to their proportion, wiii be in like manner changed with the Earth, and the Earth according to the same proportion, wiii again produce or yield them Aliment or Food agrecable to their changed condition; then I demand, Whether they shall always remain in the same Species under such a change? Or, whether there wiii not be some difference between that State and this? As for Exampie: There is between a Cow and a Horse, which is commonly granted to be Specifical. Again, I ask whether the Species of Creatures do so infinitely one excel another, that an Individual of one particular Species may still go forward in perfection, and approach nearer unto another Species, but yet never reach so far as to be changed into that Species? As for instance: An Horse in divers Qualities and Perfections draws near unto the Nature and Species of a Man, and that more than many other Creatures; Is therefore the nature of a Man distant from the Nature of an Horse, by Infinite Degrees, or by Finite only? If by Finite, then certainly a Horse may in length of Time be in some measure changed into a Man, (1 mean his Spirit; as for his Body that is a thing evident.) If infinitely distant; then unto any Man, even one of the vilest and basest Nature and Disposition, may be attributed a certain Infinite Excellence in Act, such as only agrees to God and Christ, hut to no Creature; for the highest Excellence of a Creature is to be Infinite only, in potentia, not in actu; that is, to be still in a possibility of attaining a greater Perfeetion and Excellence, ad infinitum, though it can never reach this Infinite; for how far soever an Finite Being may proceed, yet that is still Finite, although there be no tinats to its progression ... As if there should be supposed a certain Ladder, which should be infinitely long, containing Infinite Steps, yet those Steps are not infinitely distant one from another, otherwise there could be no ascension nor descension made thercon; for Steps (in this Exam- pie) signifie the various Species of Things, which cannot be infinitely distant one from another, or from those which are next unto them; yea daily experience teaches us, that the Species of dive rs Things are changed, one into another, as Earth into Water, 

and Water into Air., and Air into Fire or Aether; and the contrary, as Fire into Air, and Air into Water, &c. which yet are distinet Species of Things; and so also Stones are changed into Metals, and one Metal into another; hut least some should say these are only naked Bodies and have no Spirit, wc shall observe the same not only in Vegetables, hut also in Animals, like as Barley and Wheat are convertible the one into the other, and are in very decd often so changed, which is weil enough known to House-keepers in many Provinces, and especially in Hungary, where if Barley be sown Wheat springs up instead thereof; but in other places more harren, and especially in Rocky Places, such as are found in Germany, if Wheat be sown, Barley cometh up, and Barley in other places becomes mere Grass. And in Animals, Worms are changed into Flies, and Beasts, and Fishes that feed on Beasts, and Fishes of a different kind, do change them into their own Nature, and Species: And doth not also a corrupted Nature, or the Body of Earth and Water, produce Animals without any previous Seed of those Animals? And in the Creation of this World, did not the Waters at the Command of God, produce Birds and Fishes? And did not the Earth also at the same Command bring forth Beasts and Creeping Things; which for that Cause were real and proper Parts of the Earth and Waters? And as they had their Bodies from the Earth, so likewise they had their Spirits or Souis from the same; for the Earth brought forth Living Souis, as the Hebrew Text speaketh, hut not mere Corporeal Figures, wanting Life and Soul; wherefore there is a very remarkabla difference between Humane Creatures and Brutes: Of Man it is said, God made him after his own Image, and breathed into him the Breath of Life, and he became a Living Soul; so that from hence Man received his Life. that principle part of him, (by which he is become a Man,) which is really distinet from that Divine Soul or Spirit which God breathed into him.
And seeing the Body of Man was made out of the Earth, which (as is proved) had therein divers Spirits, and gave Spirits to all Brute Beasts; then unto Man, no doubt, She committed the best and most excellent Spirits whom he was to contain; but all tbese Spirits were of a far inferiour Species, in regard of the Spirit of Man, which he received from above, and not from the Earth: And the Spirit of Man ought to have Dominion over these Spirits, (which were all hut Earthly,) so as to subdue them to himself, and exalt them to an higher degree, (viz.) into his own proper Nature,
and that would have been his true Inerease and Multiplication; for all this he suffered the Earthly Spirits existing within him, to get Dominion over him. and so became like them; wherefore it is said, Earth thou art, and unto Earth thou shalt return, which hath no less a Spiritual than a Literal Signification.
7. Now wc see how gloriously the justice of God appears in this Transmutation of Things out of one Species into another; and that there is a certain justice which operates not only in Men and Angels, hut in all Creatures, is most certain; and he that doth not observe the same may be said to be utterly Blind: For this justice appears as weil in the Ascension of Creatures, as in their Descension; that is, when they are changed into the better, and when into the worse; when into the better, this justice distributes to them the Reward and Fruit of their Good Deeds; when into the worse,, tbc.same punisbes them with duc Punishments, according to the Nature and Degrec of the Transgression. And the same justice hath given a Law to all Creatures, and written the same on their natures; and every Creature whatsoever, that transgresseth this Law, is punished for it: But that Creature that observes and keeps it, hath this Reward viz., to become better ...
God hath also put the same instinct of justice in Man, towards Beasts and Trees of the Field; for whosoever he be that is a good and just Man, the same loves his Beasts that serve him, and taketh care of them that they have their Food and Rest, and what else is wanting to them; and this he doth not do only for his own profit, hut out of a Principle of true justice; for should he be so eruel to them as to require their labour, and yet deny them their nccessary Food. then certainly he transgresseth that Law which God hath written on his Heart; and if he kills any of them, only to fulfil his own pleasure, he acts unjustly, and the same measure wiii again be measured unto him; so likewise a Man that hath a certain Fruitful Tree in his Orehard, that prospereth weil, he dungs and eleanses the same. that it may wax better and better; but if it be harren, and ineumbers the ground, then he heweth it down with an Ax, and hurns it with Fire. And so here is a certain justice in all these, as in all the Transmutation of Things from one Species into another, whether it be by ascending from the Ignobler or Baser unto the Nobler, or by descending into the contrary, there may be found the same justice ...

Ckapter VII
Now that l may more ciearly demonstrate, that every Body is a certain Spirit or Life in its own Nature, and that the same is a certain intelligent Principie, having Knowiedge, Sense, Love, Desire, Joy, and Grief; as it is this or that way affected; and by consequence hath Activity and Motion, per se; so that it can remove it self whithersoever it desires to be: I say, in its own Nature, wherein it was originally created, and as it shall be again, when it shall be reduced to its primitiva State, and delivered from that Confusion and Vanity, to which it is subject by reason of Sin. I shall produce these following Reasons ...
i. The first hereof shall be from the Order of Things, before- mentioned. which I have already proved to be but Threc; to wit, God the Supreme or Chiefest, Christ the Medium or Middie, and the Creature the lowest in Order; which Creature is hut one Essence or substance, as to Nature or Essence, as is above demonstrated. so that it only differs secundum modos existendi; or, according to the mannens of existence; among which one is Corporiety; whereof also there are many degrees; so that a Thing may more or less approach to, or recede from the State and Condition of a body or a Spirit; hut because a Spirit (between these two) is more excellent in the Natural Order of Things, and by how much the more a Creature is a Spirit, (if at least wise it doth not any otherwise degenerate) so much the nearer it approaches to God, who is the chiefest Spirit. Hence a Body may always be more and more Spiritual, ad infinitum; because God who is the First and Supreme Spirit is Infinite, and doth not nor cannot partake of the least Corporiety; whence such is the Nature of a Creature, uniess it degenerates, that it always draws nearer and nearer unto God in likeness: But because there is no Being, which is every way contrary to God, (viz. there is no Being, which is infinitely and unchangeably Evil, as God is infinitely and unchangeahly Good; nothing infinitely Dark, as God is infinitely Light; nor any thing infinitely a Body, having nothing of Spirit, as God is infinitely a Spirit, having nothing of Body;) hence it is manifest that no Creature can become more and more a Body, ad infinitum, although the same may become more and more a Spirit, ad infinitum, and nothing can become infinitely more dark, though it may become infinitely more light: By the same reason nothing can
be Evil ad infinitum, although it may become more and more Good ad infinitum: And so indeed, in the very Nature of Things, there are limits or bounds to Evil; hut none unto Good ...
And hence may be inferred, that all the Creatures of God, which heretofore degenerated and fell from their primitiva Goodness, must after certain periods be converted and restored, not only to as good, hut unto a better State than that was in which they were ereated: For Divine Operation cannot cease: And hence it is the Nature of every Creature to be still in Motion, and always to change cither from Good to Good, or from Good into Evil, or from Evil again into Good; and because it cannot proceed infinitely to Evil, for that there is no Infinite Example thercof, hence it must necessarily return or slide into Eternal Silence, which is contrary to the Nature of it . . .
And so wc see how a Thing (the same Substance still remaining) may be marvellously changed in respect of the manners of its Existence; so that a certain Holy and Blessed Spirit, or Angel of Light, could by his voluntary Action, become a Wicked and Cursed Spirit of Darkness; which Change, or Metamorphosis, certainly is as great as if a Spirit were changed into a Body. And if it be here demanded, Whether those Spirits became more Corporeal by their Transgression, than they were in their Primitive State before they fell? I answer, Yes; hut because, as I have atready shown,l that a Spirit is capable of Corporiety, Secundum majus & minUS2 or more and less; although not infinitely, yet in many degrees. Hence it is, they could remain for many Ages, and have nothing of such a Corporeal Crassitude, as Things in this visible World have, such as are hard Stones,, or Metals, or the Bodies of Men and Women: For certainly the Bodies of the worst Spirits have not such a Crassitude as any visible body, and yet all that grossness of visible Bodies came from the Fall of Spirits from their First State: And so the Spirits after long and various periods, could contract this grossness to themselves, although they could not together, and at one and the same time fall into a universal grossness, so that the whole Body of any fallen Spirit should be in all its parts equally gross; hut some parts become grosser and grosser, and the other Corporeal parts of this Spirit (which are its immediate Vehicie, and wherewith it is most intimately united) retain a certain Tenuity or Subtility, without which the Spirit could not be so moveable and active as otherwise it would; and 

with these subtiler and more tenuious Parts of the Body, the principal Spirit (together with its ministring Spirits, so many of them as it can possibly gather together) departs out of those thicker Parts of the Body, which it leaves as so many cadaverous Bodies, which are no longer fit to serve the said Spirits in those Operations which they exercise in their present State.
And wc may observe this departure of the subtiler and stronger Spirits, out of the harder and grosser parts of the Body, into the more soft and tenuious, in a certain Spirituous Liquor, which is congealed with great coid, where the stronger Spirits (forsaking the harder Parts which are outward, and chiefly exposed to the coid) do gather themselves into the middlc Part of the Body, which is always subtile and thin, so that one only drop of that Liquor (which is not congealed, hut remaineth still liquid in the innermost Part of the congealed Body) hath in it the augmented force of all those Parts which are congealed; so that here is a two fold grossness and hardness of Bodies, the one palpable and visible to our External Senses; the other invisible and impalpable, which nevertheless is as gross as the other, yea, often grosser and harder, which may be truly perceived by the Internal Senses, although the External Senses may be insensible thereof; for the invisible and impalpable grossness or hardness is that which is proper to those Bodies, which are so small, that our External Senses cannot perceive them, when nevertheless they are really exceeding hard, yea, harder than any Flint or Metal, which we can handie with our Hands. And out of these hard and small Bodies, visible Waters are for the most part composed, although they appear to us very soft, fluid, and tenuious, by reason of the great Plenty of certain other subtile Bodies which continually agitate, and move the said hard Particies; so that Water seems to our gross Senses to be one thing Homogeneal, Simple, and Uniform, although it consisteth of many Heterogeneous and Dissimilar or differing Parts, more than many other Bodies; and many of tbese Parts are exceeding hard and stony, whence proceeds Gravel, hubbling forth, and all other little Sands and Stones, which have their Original and Birth from the Waters springing from the bottom of the Earth; and when those little Stones, or stony Particies of Water, grow into visible Sand and Stones, the same after some time do again lose this hardness, and become more soft and tenuious, than when they belonged to the Waters; for Stones do rot, and are converted into soft Earth,, and out of this proceed Animals; so also Stones
putrifying, do often become Water again; hut this Water is of another Species than the former, for one is petrefying, the other mollifying; as it is observed that from one Mountain in Helvetia two Kinds of Water flow, one whercof being drunken breeds the Stone, and the other is a proper remedy against it; so that one Water is changed into a Stone, and the other Water proeceds from that Stone, whiist it is in Corruption, and so it alters and loseth its former hardness: And so from what hath been said may the better be understood, how the Heart and Spirit of a Wicked Man may be said to be hard and stony; because indeed his Spirit hath in it a real hardness, such as is found in those little stony Particies of certain Waters; when on the contrary the Spirits of good Men are soft and Tender; which internat softness and hardness of Spirits, wc may also really feel, and every Good Man doth as sensibly perceive the same, as the externat hardness of gross Bodies is discerned by the outward touch; hut such who are dead in their Sins, have not this sense of the hardness or softness of Good or Evil Spirits; and therefore they call these only metaphorical Speeches, when indeed the Things are really so in a proper sence, and that without any Figure.
2.. The Second Reason, that ereated Spirits are convertible into Bodies, and Bodies into Spirits, I shall deduce from a serious and duc consideration of the Divine Attributes; from which, as from a Treasury of Instructions, may be manifested the Truth of all Things: For seeing God is infinitely Good, and conimunieates his Goodness infinite ways to his Creatures; so that there is no Creature which doth not receive something of his Goodness, and that very largely: And seeing the Goodness of God is a living Goodness, which hath Life, Power, Love, and Knowiedge in it, which he communicates to his Creatures, How can it be, that any dead Thing should proceed from him, or be created by Him, such as is mere Body or Matter, according to their Hypothesis, who affirm, that the same is wholly inconvertible, to any degree of Life or Knowiedge? It is truly said of one that God made not Death, and it is as true, that he made no dead Thing: For how can a dead Thing depend of him, who is infinitely Life and Charity? Or how can any creature receive so vile and diminutive an Essence from him, (who is so infinitely Liberal and Good,) that should partake nothing of Life or Knowiedge, nor ever be able to aspire to it, no not in the least degree? Hath not God created all his Creatures for 

this end, that in him they might be Blessed, and enjoy his Divine Goodness, in their several States and Conditions? But how can this be without Life or Sense? Or how can any Thing, that wanteth Life, enjoy Divine Goodness? But wc shall urge this Argument a little farther, The Divine Attributes are commonly and rightly distinguished, into communicable, and incommunicable; the incommunicable are, that God is a Being, subsisting by himself, Independent, Unchangcable, absolutely Infinite, and most Perfect: The communicable are, that be is a Spirit, Life, and Light, that be is Good, Holy, just, Wise, &c. But now there are none of these communicable Attributes, which are not living, yea Life it self: And because every Creature hath a Communieation with God in some of his Attributes, now I demand, In what Attribute dead Matter hath it, or a Body that is uncapable of Life and Sense for ever? If it be said, It agrees with God in Entity, or that it is an Essence, I Answerl In God there is no dead Being, whercof be is or can be Partaker: Whencel therefore, shall this have its dead Essence? Moreover the Entity or Being of a Thing is not properly an Attribute thercof; hut an Attribute is properly, tale quid, or something that is predicated or affirmed of that Being: Now what Attributes or Perfeetions can be attributed to dead Matter, which do analogically Answer to those which are in God? If we diligently enquire thereinto, we shall find none at all; for all his Attributes are living; yea, Life it self. Moreover, seeing the Creatures of God, so far as they are Creatures, ought necessarily in some things to resemble their Creator; now I demand, in what, dead matter is like unto God? If they say again in naked Entity, I Answer, There is none such in God or his Creatures: And so it is a mere non ens, or notbing.
But as touching the other Attributes of Matter, viz, Impenetra- bility, Figurability, and Mobility; certainly none of these have any place in God, and so are not of his communicable Attributes; hut rather Essential Differences or Attributes of Diversity, whereby the Creature, as such, is distinguished from God; as also Mutabil- ity is of the Number of those differential Attributes, whence it cannot be said that Mutability is of the communicable Attributes of God: And in like manner. Impenetrability, Figurability, and Mobility, do not pertain unto the communicable Attributes of God; hut to those only in which the Creatures differ from him. And seeing dead Matter doth not partake of any of the communi- cable Attributes of God, we must certainly conciude, that the same
is a mere non ens, or nothing, a false Fiction or Chimaera, and so a thing impossible. If they say, it hath a metaphysieal Goodness and Truth. even as every Being is Good and True: Again; I demand What is that Goodness and Truth? For if it hath no participation with any of the communicable Attributes of God, it wiii be ncither Good nor True, and so a mere Fiction, as before was said. Moreover. seeing it cannot be said, wherein dead Matter doth any way partake of Divine Goodness, much less can it be shown, how it may be capable always to acquire a greater Perfection, ad infinitum, which is the nature of all Creatures, viz. to increase, and infinitely advance towards a farther Perfection as is before demonstrated. But what farther progress in Goodness or perfec~ tion hath a dead Matter? Because after it hath suffered Infinite Changes of Motion and Figure it is constrained always to remain dead,l as before; and if Motion and Figure contribute nothing to the receiving of Life, then certainly this is made never the better; nay, is not in the least degrec promoted in Goodness: For suppose this dead Matter had undergone all Forms, and been transmuted into all Kinds of Figures, even the most regular and exact: What doth this profit this Matter or Body, because it wants all Life and Sense? So let us suppose the same to'have undergone Infinite Kinds of Motion, from slowness to swiftness; Wherein, therefore, is it better, by the way of its Intrinsecal Melioration? For the Argument speaketh of Intrinsecal Melioration, which is such a Melioration as the Nature of the Thing it self requireth, and which is performed thereby; but a mere dead Body, or Matter, requires no kind of Motion or Figure; nor, in it self, is perfected more by one Motion, or Figure, than by another: for it is alike indifferent to all Motions and Figures whatsoever, and by consequence is not perfected or bettered by any of them. And then what advantage wiii it have from all these helps, if it always remain a dead and impassible Thing?
3. My Third Reason is drawn from the great Love and Desire that the Spirits or Souls have towards Bodies, and especially towards those with which they are united, and in which they have their Habitation: But now the Foundation of all Love or Desire, whereby one Thing is carried unto another, stands in this, That cither they are of the same Nature and substance with them, or like unto them, or both; or that one hath its Being from the other, whereof wc have an Example in all living Creatures which bring 

forth their young; and in like manner also in men, how they love that which is horn of them: For so also even Wicked Men and Women (if they are not extremely perverse, and void of Parental Love) do Love their Children, and cherish them with a Natural Affeetion, the cause whereof certainly is this, That their Children are of the same Nature and Substance, viz. as though they were Parts of them; and if they are like them, cither in Body, Spirit, or Manners, hereby their Love is the more inereased: So also wc observe that Animals of one Species love one another more than those that are of a different Species; whence also Cattie of one Kind feed together; Birds of a Kind flock together; and Fishes of a Kind swim together; and so Men rather converse with Men, than with any other Creatures: But besides this particular Love, there remains yet something of Universal Love in all Creatures, one towards another, setting aside that great confusion which hath fallen out since, by reason of Transgression; which certainly must procced from the same Foundation, viz. in regard of their First Substance and Essence,, they were all one and the same Thing, and as it were Parts and Members of one Body. Moreover, in every Species of Animals, we see how the Male and Female Love one another, and in all their Propagations (which are not Monstrous, and contrary to Nature) they respect each other; and that proeceds not only from the unity of Nature, but also by reason of a certain eminent similitude or likeness between them. And hoth these Foundations of Love between a Man and a Woman, are expresly mentioned in Genesis; but that which Adam spoke concerning his Wife, This is Bone ofmy Bone, and Flesh of my Flesk, &c. pertains unto the Unity of Nature; for she was taken out of him, and was a part of him, and therefore be loved her. Moreover also, concerning Similitude, it is said, there was no Help found for him, or before his Face, as it is in the Hebrew (i.e.) among all Creatures be saw not his like,, with whom be would converse. until Eve was made for him. But there is yet another cause of Love, when Beings, that love each other. are not one Substance, but one gave Being to the other, and is the proper and real cause thereof. And so it is in the case between God and Creatures; for be gave to all, Being, Life, and motion; and therefore be loves all Creatures; neither can be not love them; yea, at the same time when be seems to bate and be angry with them, this his Anger, and what proceeds therefrom, viz. Punishments and judgments, turns to their Good, because be perceiveth they have nced of them. So, on the contrary, the Creatures which have
not wholly degenerated, and lost all sense of God, do love him; and this is a certain Divine Law, and Instinct, which he put in all rational Creaturesl that they might love him, which is the fulfilling of the whole Law: But those Creatures which draw most near unto God in similitude or likeness, do love him the more, and are the more loved of him. But if it be thought there is another principal cause of Love, to wit, Goodness, which is the most vehement or powerful Magnet thercof, whence also God is above all the most to be loved; because he is the best; which Goodness is in some measure in Creaturesl cither really or apparently; wherefore such are loved of their Fellow-Creatures.- I Answer: It must be granted indecd, that Goodness is a great, yea the greatest Cause of Love, and the proper Object of it; but this Goodness is not a distinct Cause from those before laid down, hut is comprehended in them. Wherefore do we call a Thing Good? But because it citber really or apparently pleases us, for the unity it bath with us, or which wc have with it: Hence it comes to pass, that Good Men love Good Men, and not otherwise; for Good Men cannot love Evil, nor Evil Men Good Men as such; for there is no greater similitude than between Good and Good: For the reason why we call or esteem a Thing Good, is this, that it benefits us, and that wc are made Partakers of its Goodness, and so here the First Cause of Similitude is still Militant.- So likewise, when one Thing gives being to another, as when God and Christ give Being to Creatures (as from whom have every true Essence proceeded,) here is in like manner a certain Similitude; for it is impossible that the Creatures should not in some Things be like their Creator, and agree with him in some Attributes or Perfections.
This being supposed a Touch-stone, we shall now return to our subject matter, (i.e.) to exaråne, whether Spirits and Bodies are of one Nature and Substance, and so convertible one into another? Therefore. I demand, What is the reason, That the Spirit or Soul so loveth the Body wherewith it is united, and so unwillingly departs out of it, that it has been manifestly notorious, the Souis of some have attended on, and been subject to their Bodies, after the Body was dead, until it was corrupted, and dissolved into dust. That the Spirit or Soul gave a distinct Being to the Body, or the Body to the Spirit, cannot be the reason of this Love; for that were Creation in a strict sence; hut this (viz.) to give Being unto Things agrees only to God and Christ; therefore that necessarily comes to pass by reason of that similitude they have one with another, or some 

Affinity in their Natures: Or, if it be said, there is a certain Goodness in the Body, which moves the Spirit to love it, certainly this Goodness must necessarily answer to something in the Soul which is like it, otherwise it could not be carried unto it; yea, let them inform us what that Goodness in the Body is, for which the Soul doth so fervently love it? or in what Attributes or Perfections a Body is like a Spirit; if a Body is nothing hut a dead Trunk, and a certain Mass which is altogether uncapable of any degrec of Life, and Perfection? if they say a Body agrees with a Spirit Ratione enris, or in respect of Being; that is to say; as this hath Being so that hath the same; this is already refuted in the former Argument; for if this Being hath no Attributes or Perfections wherein it may agree with the Being of a Spirit, then it is only a mere Fiction; for God created no Naked Ens, or Being, which should be a mere Being, and have no Attributes that may be predicated of it; besides also, Ensy is only a Logical Notion or Term, which Logicians do call Genus generalissimum, or the most General Kind, which in the naked and abstracted Notion of it, is not in the Things themselves, but only in the Conception of Humane Intelleet. And therefore every true Being is a certain single Nature, whereof may be affirmed such and such Attributes: Now what are those Attributes of Body, wherein it resembles a Spirit? Let us examine the principal Attributes of Body, as distinet from a Spirit, according to their Opinion, who so much dispute, that Body and Spirit are so infinitely distant in Nature, that one can never become the other: The Attributes are these, That a Body is impenetrable of all other Bodies, so that the parts thereof cannot penetra'@te each other; hut there is another Attribute of Body, viz. to be discerpible or divisible into parts-. But the Attributes of Spirit (as they define it) are penetrability and indiscerpihility, so that one Spirit can penetrate another; also, that a thousand Spirits can stand together one within another, and yet possess no more Space than one Spirit. Moreover, that a Spirit is so simple, and one in it self, that it cannot be rent asunder, or actually divided into separate parts. If now the Attributes of Body and Spirit are compared together, they are so far from being like one another, or having any Analogy of Nature (in which nevertheless the true Foundation of Love and Unity doth consist, as before was said,) that they are plainly contrary; yea, nothing in the whole World can be conceived so contrary to any Thing, as Body and Spirit, in the opinion of these Men. For here is a pure and absolute contrariety in all their Attributes; because
Penetrability and Impenetrability are more contrary one to another than black and white, or hot and coid: For that which is black may become white, and that which is hot may become coid- But (as they say) that which is impenetrable cannot be made penetrable; yea, God and Creatures do not so infinitely differ in Essence one from another; as these Doctors make Body to differ from Spirit: For there are many Attributes, in which God and the Creatures agree together; hut we can find none, wherein a Body can any way agrec with a Spirit, and by consequence, nor with God,, who is the chiefest and purest of Spirits; wherefore it can be no Creature, hut a mere Non-entity or Fiction: But as Body and Spirit are contrary in the Attributes of Penetrability and Impene- trability; so are they no less contrary in Discerpihility and Indiscerpihility: But if they alledge, that Body and Spirit do agree in some Attributes, as Extension, Mobility, and Figurability; so that Spirit hath Extension, and can reach from one place to another, and also can move it self from place to place, and form it self into whatsoever Figure it pleaseth, in which cases it agrees with a Body. and a Body with it: To this I Answer: Supposing the first, that a Spirit can be extended (which yet many of them deny, yea most, who teach that Body and Spirit are essentially distinct) yet the Extension of Body and Spirit, as they understand it, do wonderfully differ; for the Extension of Body is always impenetra- ble; yea, to be extended, and impenetrable, as pertaining to Body, is only one real Attribute proposed in two Mental and Logical Notions, or ways of speaking; for what is Extension, unless the Body (wheresoever it is) be impenetrable of its own proper parts? But remove this Attribute of Impenetrability from a Body, and it cannot be conceived any longer, as extended. Moreover also, the Extension of Body and Spirit, according to their Notion, infinitely differ; for whatsoever Extension a Body hath, the same is so necessary and essential to it, that it is impossible for it to be more or less extended; when nevertbeless a Spirit may be more or less extended; as they affirm; and seeing to be moveable and figurable, are only consequential Attributes of Extension, (for that a Spirit is far otherwise moveable and figurable than a Body, because a Spirit can move and form it self as a Body cannot:) The same Reason which is good against the one is good against the other also.
4. But, Secondly, How can they prove Impenetrability is an Essential Attribute of Body; or that Penetrability is an Essential 

Attribute of Spirit? Why may not Body be more or less impenetra- ble, and Spirit more or less penetrable, as it may, and indecd doth happen in all other attributes? For ex. gr. some Body may be more or less heavy or light, condensed or rarefied, solid or liquid, hot or coid; then why may it not also be more or less penetrable or impenetrable? If it be said, that in all those other Mutations wc always observe, that a Body remains impenetrable, as Iron when it is heat red-hot, yet remains still impenetrable: I Answer, I grant it may remain impenetrable of any other Body of equal thickness; yet may, and is entirely penetrated of a more subtile Body, sc. of the Fire which hath entred into it, and penetrated all its parts, whereby 'tis made so soft; and if the Fire be stronger, begins wholly to melt. But if, against this, they Object, that the ingress of Fire into the Iron, is not penetration in a Philosophical Sence, nor as they understand it. viz. as though the Fire and Iron did possess but one place, and so the one could be intrinsecally present in the other; because it is manifest to the contrary, that Iron (if it be made candent or glowing hot) it swelleth and acquireth a greater Bulk, than when it is cold; and as it waxeth cold again, it returneth to its former dimension. To this I Answer: If they mean such a Penetration, which we call Intrinseck Presence, viz. that one Homogeneal Substance should enter into another, hoth being of equal Dimensions, and yet the bulk or quantity not increased, that seems wholly irrational: and it would be a mere impossibility and contradiction to grant such an intimate Presence in Creatures, which only agrees unto God and Christ as Creators, whose Prerogative it is to be intrinsecally present in dieatures; whereas no Creature can have that Intrinseck Presence in its Fellow Creature. because then it would cease to be a Creature and obtain one of the incommunicable Attributes of God and Christ, which is Intrinseck Presence. This (1 say) is primarily to be attributed to God, and secondarily to Christ, in as much as he is Medium quid, or a certain Medium between God and Creatures. and who as he is Partaker of Mutability and lmmutability, of Eternity and Time; so he may be said to be Partaker of Body and Spirit, and consequently of Place and Extension: For, in as much as his Body is of another Substance than the Bodies of all other Creatures, (as of whom he is the nearest Beginning to God,) it may be truly said, he is intrinsecally present in them, and yet not so as to be confounded with them. For to suppose one Creature intrinsecally present in another,, so as to be mingled and most perfeetly united with it, and
yet its Quantity or Extension not increased, that confounds the Creatures, and maketh two or more to be but one: Yea, according to this Hypothesis, it may be said the whole Creation is reducible into the quantity of the least Grain or Dust, because every part would be supposed to penetrate another, and no greater extension follow than of one Part. But if it be said, that only proves that Spirits may be reduced into so small a space hut not Bodies: Because Bodies are Impenetrable. I Answer, This is but a begging of the question, because they have not yet proved that Body and Spirit are distinct Substances; which, unicss they are, it follows that one Nature is not more penetrable than the other, according to their sense. And indeed it seems very consentaneous to Reason, that as Times are each of them so extended into their duc Measures and Extensions, that they cannot exceed those Bounds, and so cannot be intrinsecally present one with another; as (ex. gr.) the First Day of the Week cannot be present with the Second Day of the same Week; nor the First Hour of the Day with the Second; ncither is the First Minute of an Hour present with the Second Minute thereof; because such is the Nature and Essence of Time, that it is successiva, and hath partes extra partes, or parts, one without another. When nevertheless God is really and intrinse- cally present in all Times, and is not changed, which cannot be said of the Creature, sc. that that is present in all or more Times, and not changed; for the Creature is perpetually changed with Times, seeing Times are nothing else hut the Motion or Change of the Creature from one State or Condition into another. And as it is in the case of Time. and Creatures which are in Time. so also in the case of Place, Bulk, or Quantity; for as in God there is no Time, so also in him there is no Bulk or Corporeal Quantity; hut in Creatures there is hoth Time and Corporeal Quantity; because otherwise they would be either God, or Nothing, which is impossible. 

For whatsoever Quantity, Bulk, or Extension any Creature hath, it retains the same, as sometbing which is of its own Essence; as it is the Essence of Time to consist of more parts, and those again of more, and so ad infinitum: For it may be easily conceived how a less Time is in a greater, ex. gr. how so many Minutes are in an Hour, and so many Hours in a Day; and one Hour doth immediately touch the next, hut cannot be present in it, the same is to be understood of the Creatures. in regard of their Quantity or Bulk; for indeed one Creature may immediately touch another, hut cannot be present in all its parts, but only a less may be in a greater, and a subtiler in a grosser; and this is more properly Penetration which agrees to Bodies as weil as Spirits; as some Body, that is less gross may penetrate another that is more gross; but two Bodies of an equal thickness cannot penetrate each other: The same may be said of Spirits which have their degrees of more or less grossness, as Bodies have: Neither is there any other difference between Body and Spirit, (if Body be not taken in their sence, who teach that it is a Thing merely Dead, and void of Life or a Capacity thereof; but in a proper sence: sc. that it is an excellent Creature having Life and Sense, which either actually or poten- tially agrees to it) but this that a Body is the grosser part of a thing, and Spirit the subtiler, whence also Spirit hath its name from the Air, which is the most subtile nature in this visible World.

Neither doth this hinder, that we observe, how some very small Body may be extended into a Spacc a Thousand times greater than it had; even as Gun-Powder, if it be set on Fire doth marvellously extend itself; for all this Extension is made by Division of Parts into Parts, still less and less, which indecd do not fill all that Space so great as it seems, when in the mean while each part hath neither greater nor lesser Extension than it had before. Supposing this, it must be conciuded that all Creatural Spirits, which are present in Bodies, are either in the Pores of the said Bodies, or in certain Coneavities made there, as Moles make in the Earth; or else they cause the said Bodies to be puffed up, and acquire a greater Extension; as when Fire copiously enters Iron, it notably puffs up and extends the same: And although this Turgesceney, or puffing up of Bodies, cannot be always observed by out External Senses; yet it cannot therefore be denied: For 'tis possible, that a certain Body may considerably grow or inerease in its dimensions, and become intirely greater, and yet this increase of Magnitude may shun all outward Observation; yea, it may be so subtile that it cannot be expressed by Numbers; ex. gr. let us suppose some Body, whose Solidity or Cube may contain 64 Parts, and another whose Solidity contains i:oo, where the root of the former Body whose Cube is 64 is 4; so that the side of the Body contains four Longitudes of the Parts so divided; hut the side or root of the other Body, whose Cube is i oo, can be expressed by no Number; for it is greater than 4, and less than 5, and no Fraction can determine the same: Therefore Bodies (as was said) may be considerahly swoln or puffed up, (if more Spirits or subtiler Bodies enter into them,)
and yet so as that our gross Senses may judge them not at all greater. Now that wc may come to the other Attribute, which is said to be of Body hut not of Spirit, viz. Discerpibility; if they understand it so; that one only Body, even the least that can be conceived (if any such Body can be conceived) may be divided; that is certainly impossible; for it is a contradiction in terms, and supposes every the least Body to be discerpible into lesser Parts. 

But if Body be taken individually only for one single Body, that is indiscerpihle; and that which we call the Discerpihility of Body means only this, sc. That we may divide one Body from another, by placing some Third Body between them; and according to this sence Spirits are no less discerpihle than Bodies; for although one single Spirit cannot become two or more Spirits, yet more Spirits coexisting in one Body, are no less separable one from another than Bodies; for however Bodies or Spirits may be divided or separated from one another in the whole Universe, yet they still remain united in this separation; seeing the whole Creation is still but one Substance or Entity, neither is there a Vacuum in it; How then can any thing be separated from it self? 

I mean, from that which is its proper Nature, as considered Originally, or in its Beginning, or First Being? But as there is a General Unity of All Creatures one with another, so that none can be separated from his Fellow-Creatures; so there is a more special and particular Unity between the Parts of one particular Species: As when the Body is divided, or torn asunder, and the Members removed one from another unto a certain distance, so long as these Members are not corrupted, and changed into another Species, they still send certain subtile Particies one to another, and to the Body from whence they came, and the Body sends the like unto them, (which we call Spirits, and Bodies, or Spirits, for they are either,) by means whercof the Parts and Members so apparently separated, still retain a certain real Unity and Sympathy, as is manifest from sundry Examples; and especially the two following: The First of which is this: A certain Man wanting a Nose, ordered one to be made for him out of the Flesh of another Man, which being vitally agglutinated, (as a Scion or Graft is united with the Trunk of the Tree into which it is put;) when the other Man died, and his Body corrupted, this Nose was likewise corrupted, and fell from the Body of this living Man. 

The Second Example is of a Man whose Leg was cut off; which Leg being removed some considerable distance from the rest of the Body, when a certain Chirurgeon cut it, this Man complained of Pains, and showed in what part the said Leg was wounded, which manifestly proves that there is a certain Union of Parts, though separated at a great distance one from another: And so also Individuals of one Species or such who have a singular Affinity in Specie, have a Union one with another, although locally distant, which is yet more manifest in Humane Kind: For if two Men intirely love one another, they are by this love so united, that no distance of place can divide or separate them; for they are present (one with another) in Spirit; so that there passeth a continual Efflux, or Emanation of Spirits, from the one to the other, whereby they are found together, and united as with Chains: And so whatsoever a Man loves, whether it be Man or Beast, whether a Tree, or whether Silver or Gold, he is united with the same, and his Spirit passeth into that very Thing; and here is to be observed, that though the Spirit of Man is commonly spoken in the Singular, as though it were hut one Thing; yet the said Spirit is a certain composition of more, yea innumberable Spirits; as the Body is a composition of more Bodies, and hath a certain Order and Government in all its Parts, much more the Spirit which is a great Army of Spirits, wherein there are distinct Offices under one governing Spirit. And s  o from hence it appears that Impenetrability and Indiscerpibility, are not more Essential Attributes of Body, than of Spirit; because in one sence they agree unto either, in another sence unto neither.